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Abstract: In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes time as the formal condition on which all phenomena are 
based upon. He considers it as a one-dimensional subject, that is not an empirical perception, which is given a priori 
and nothing else but the form of an inner sense. Elias contradicts this, as he differentiates between a social time and 
a physical time. He demands an understanding for the relation between time in ’society' and in ’nature'. Elias states 
that languages (he specifically mentions German) often don't have a word that would be equivalent to the English 
term “timing". For Elias ’time' is part of the fifth dimension, the dimension of symbols, of experience, of awareness. 
Only this makes it possible to find out and know what time really is in a social context, a specific synthesis of 
occurrences, that has to be learned in higher developed societies that are based on the division of labour. Elias 
mentions ’time', but he states that it's only a synchronisation of positions in the seriatim of events. 
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Time as a matter of the internal sense 
 
Immanuel Kant was one of the most influential thinkers in Western Philosophy. He 
developed a concept of time, which was based on his idea of the internal sense. For Kant time 
and space are not a necessary combination, as it is in physics, for him time is a formal condition 
upon which all phenomena are based on (Kant, B 46). In his “Critique of Pure Reason” Kant 
examines “time” and “space” in two different chapters and hardly ever mentions one expression 
in the other. In Kant’s philosophy we have the problem that he doesn’t give a real definition of 
what time really is. Kant states, that time is given a priori (Kant, B 46) and only in itself the 
reality of all phenomena is possible (Kant, B 46). So what we see here is that time had always 
existed and therefore every human knows what time is. When the mentioned phenomena or 
intuitions just don’t happen, time still exists. Time can’t be thought away from these phenomena, 
eventhough we are able to “represent to ourselves time void of phenomena” (Kant, B 46). 
Kant characterizes space as a matter of the external sense. The human can recognize what 
space is by its five senses, even if there are no phenomena in space. The same goes for time, 
which is also given a priori, but a matter of the internal sense. It is “not an empirical conception, 
which can be deduced from some experience. For neither coexistance nor succession would be 
perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a foundation a priori” (Kant, B 46). 
So time can’t be experienced, it can’t be examined empirically, which brings me to the question 
of the “why”? He states, that time is given a priori but that includes that every human would 
have the same idea of what time is. That different civilizations and societies could have a 
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different idea of time, he doesn’t take into consideration. The idea, that time has to be learned 
through the process of socialisation doesn’t come to his mind either. “Time is not a discursive, or 
as it is called, general conception, but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different times are 
merely parts of one and the same time” (Kant, B 47). Here he states, that only one time exists, 
which is one dimensional (Kant, B 47), and it consists out of many other ‘part-times’, which of 
course he doesn’t tend to define. The problem with Kant is that he hardly gives any closer 
definitions, as everything is already given a priori. The concept of time at Kant is based on his 
idea that the human has an external and an internal sense and time can be only recognized by an 
internal sense. “Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions 
of self of our internal state. For time can not be any determination of outward phenomena. It has 
to do neither with shape nor position on the contrary, it determines the relation of representations 
in our internal state.” (Kant, B 49f).  
Kant always speaks of an internal sense, internal state, an internal view, but he never says 
what that really is supposed to be. He states that “space, as the pure form of external intuition, is 
limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena alone” (Kant, B 50), but in the same 
sentence he brings in, that time is a “condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever - the 
immediate condition of all internal (our souls1) and thereby the mediate condition of all external 
phenomena.” (Kant, B 51). I notice here an inconsistency, as first Kant insists that time is a 
matter of the internal sense, but then he suddenly sees it as a mediate condition of all external 
phenomena. As space is the matter of the external phenomena, how come that time is it as well? 
In physics time and space go hand in hand, but if they do in Kant’s philosophy as well, how 
come he has talks about them in separate chapters of his “Critique of Pure Reason” as if they 
were strictly different conditions that have got nothing to do with each other? Occasionally he 
relates them, but in general there is a strict separation between space and time. 
 
 
Time as a gauge of change 
 
When talking about time, the term of “change” always comes up. But what does that 
really imply? In classical physics (mechanics), time and space go hand in hand and therefore 
everything else, like speed, velocity, in other words, the change of location of a subject is 
defined by them. Especially Isaac Newton had quite an impact on the definition of time and 
space and the correlation of the two. In his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica he 
describes time as something absolute, which would flow consistent without any relation to any 
kind of external subject (Newton, 2007). As this view dominated mathematics and philosophy 
 
1 The original German edition speaks of “unserer Seelen” (our souls), while the English translation seems to 
have forgotten about that part of the sentence. 
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until Einstein’s Theory of Relativity was published in 1905, it can be taken for granted that 
Immanuel Kant also based his concept of time on Newton’s idea. He acknowledges time as “not 
something which subsists of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective determination 
[…],it would be something real, yet without presenting to any power of perception any real 
object” (Kant, B 49). So Kant considers time as existing and as something that would also have 
some content. Time has to be related to something and can’t stand alone. In physics this is the 
relation between time and space, which implicates a matter of change, but in his “Critique of 
Pure Reason” Kant examines time and space separately. 
Immanuel Kant combines the terms of “movement” and “change” though, as he writes 
that “the conception of change, and with it the conception of motion (as change of place) is only 
possible through and in the representation of time: that if this representation were not an intuition 
(internal) a priori , no conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible the possibility 
of change, in other words, of a conjunction of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the 
same object, for example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the same 
thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily 
opposed determinations in one thing, that is, after each other.” (Kant, B 48f.). So we can see 
here, that the change of location is only possible when taking time into consideration as well. It 
is impossible to be in two places at the same time, but it is possible to be in one place at one time 
and not being there anymore in the following moment. This also implicates, that time flows 
constantly without any external influence or a different relation system. This theory by Newton 
was falsified by Einstein later, but as there is a difference of nearly 100 years between Kant’s 
death and Einstein’s publication, it can’t be held against Kant, that he never thought about the 
possibility of time not being absolute. 
 
 
Norbert Elias critique on Kant’s conception of “time” as a matter of limited experiences 
and possibilities 
 
Norbert Elias criticizes Kant’s idea of time given a priori and being a matter of an 
internal sense that way, that it’s a result of his own experience. According to Kant time is given a 
priori and the humans don’t have to learn what time is, while Elias claims that every human has a 
different perception of time, which has developed over generations. When Kant and Descartes 
would speak of “experience, they only considered the idea of a single, complete autochthonic 
unit of a human and not the - over the centuries growing - experiences and thought abilities of a 
developing humanity” (Elias, 1994, p. 3f). That way, Elias openly attacks the idea of an a priori 
given time and combines it with the development of civilization. In the matter of a civilizing 
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process, time has to be developed out of several different factors so that it reaches today’s stage 
and conception.  
Immanuel Kant is often criticized that he never left Königsberg and therefore lacks the 
experience of being in contact with other cultural thoughts and societies (Elias would never 
speak of ‘societies’ as such, he would prefer to use the term ‘communities’, as every ‘society’ 
exists out of individual persons, who form a community). So Kant imposes his construction of 
thoughts on everyone and everything else and takes this as a pars pro toto example that is 
unchangeable, without thinking of the possibility that his hypothesis can be proved valid or not 
in that way that every human has the same idea of what time is, in the same level of a synthesis, 
that Kant described as a constant remaining condition of all human experience (Elias, 1994, p. 
31). Considering that Elias migrated several times (from Breslau, Germany, which is today’s 
Wroclaw, Poland, to France, then to Great Britain, then to Ghana and later on to the Netherlands) 
it can be taken for granted, that he got in touch with different cultural views and ideas, which 
also involve different conceptions and ideas of ‘time’. Especially the period from 1963 to 1964 - 
when he stayed at the university in Legon, Ghana - should have given him a completely different 
view on ‘time’, as in African countries the dimension of time is perceived in a completely 
different manner. That way, we have to see, when we take a look at Kant’s and Elias’ definitions 
on ‘time’ that we also have to consider their social and cultural background. Elias brings in, that 
during Kant’s time physics and engineering made huge developments and that this also referred 
to ‘time’. Kant would have “discovered this term on himself as an unskilled form of his own and 
‘of the human as such’ as recognition” (Elias, 1994, p. 31).  
 
 
Lingual insufficiencies 
 
When trying to describe what ‘time’ is, then of course a language has to be used. So 
every language has different ways to describe and express ‘time’ and Elias states, that the 
substantial version of the word tends to mislead, as the “convention to speak and think in reified 
terms, can make the recognition of correlations very difficult” (Elias, 1970, p. 73). That way, 
‘time’ as a noun becomes more of a personification of something than a physical or social flow. 
As Elias’ mother tongue was German (just like Kant’s), he specifically mentions the lack of a 
word called ‘zeiten’ (Elias, 1994, p. 8) in that language. It would be an equivalent to the English 
term ‘timing’ and would address very clearly, that the meaning of looking at a clock or watch is 
nothing else, but synchronising two or more following positions (Elias, ibid.). Instead of one 
clear word for that, German offers several expressions like “die Zeit messen” (to measure 
time),“die Zeit bestimmen” (to set time) or even “die Zeit totschlagen” (to kill time). Especially 
the last expression shows the problem how insufficient languages can be, as for describing time 
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and its nature. How can you kill something that will still exist afterwards in your perception? If I 
am not mistaken, then it is only possible to kill something that won’t exist anymore after the act 
of mortality, so that it is not alive anymore. That way lingual customs just show over and over 
again, that ‘time’ is a myth, that exists in a way and can be measured and set by people, but can’t 
be apprehended by the human’s senses (Elias, ibid.). Elias criticizes Kant here in that way, that 
he states that it is possible to discuss about the idiosyncratic essence of time over centuries and 
be the master of mystery, when there is no secret or mystery at all (Elias, 1994,. p. 9). For Elias, 
time is a matter of synchronisation of activities compared to each other or to a certain solid point 
that it can be measured from and languages are insufficiently equipped with verbs to describe 
that, so that the essence of time has become a substantive. 
 
 
Social Time vs. Physical Time 
 
While Kant does not discern between different forms of ‘time’, Elias introduces a new 
perspective on time: the difference between ‘social time” and ‘physical time’. These two terms 
need to be examined a little bit closer, as both form a synthesis in the way the term ‘time’ is 
commonly understood.  
Going back to early civilizations, it was the duty of priests and other wise men (there 
were less women in these positions, as ancient societies were masculine dominated) to set the 
exact times (plural is intended here) for planting, harvesting and holding celebrations for diverse 
gods. They observed the course of the sun and the stars and decided by their positioning when 
the best time would be for all the activities. They set the time in an active way, while the people, 
who were told by the priests what to do when, were setting the time passively. A calendar 
developed out of this interaction which, according to Elias, was also an arbitrary construction 
(Elias, 1994, p. 66). The different time units, like ‘year’, ‘month’, ‘hour’ or ‘minute’ are standard 
intervals, which are related to a prior and following position of a changing unit (Elias, ibid.). 
Kant never thought about this development of how ‘time’ is categorized, he only looked at it 
from a metaphysic and transcendental point of view. That time units are a necessity for 
understanding what time is, he left out completely. The problem with these time units is, that 
somehow they are arbitrary set. It’s always a relation to something that defines such a unit. A 
year is the period the earth needs to circulate around the sun once, a day is that period of ‘time’ 
that the earth needs to rotate around its own axis once. I assume, that for the simplicity of it, in 
the early days of mankind a day was defined as the span between sunrise and the following 
sunrise. That would explain, why the ancient Romans started counting the hours from 6:00 
o’clock (now our time) in the morning on. The following 60 minutes were called “first hour”. 
Now this brought up the problem that during the summer the sun rose earlier, while during 
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winter the sun rose later that the standard time was set. Still the initial hour of the day was 
defined as “first hour”. I don’t want to go further into the details of calendar calculations, but this 
example shows, that ‘time’ is also a matter of relations, when it comes to declaring and defining 
what a year or a day is. The early calendar systems of Egypt used the solar year, while the 
Romans used the lunar year and the discrepances between these two systems are very significant, 
as with the sun and the moon they both have a different reference object. 
When we take a closer look at the medieval ages and renaissance , then we notice that 
through Galilei’s experiments on the motion of bodies with having the balls dropped from The 
Leaning Tower of Pisa the phrase of ‘having measured the time’ turns up for the first time (see 
Galilei in Elias, 1994, p. 84). Prior to Galilei, other physicists and mathematicians had described 
the relation of mass and distances and time, but they all focussed on speed and velocity and not 
on time as such. That way, according to Elias, time was split in two different types: a physical 
and a social time. In a physical way, time “appears as an aspect of the ‘physical nature’, as one 
of the unchangeable variants, that physicists measure and which play their role in mathematical 
equilibrations, which are thought as symbolic representatives of nature’s ‘laws’” (Elias, 1994, p. 
93). So when we take into consideration, that clocks existed during Kant’s lifetime already, then 
I still find it strange that he never mentions something like a physical time. Clocks and nowadays 
also wrist-watches are nothing but representatives of a physical time, in which a second as its 
unit is defined the following way: “the duration of 9 192 631 770 periods of the radiation 
corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the 
caesium 133 atom” (BIPM, 1967). Elias defines clocks as an integrative part of a social order, 
which can’t function without them, as social time is a regulator, a modus of human experience, 
of social events and happenings (Elias, 1994, p. 93). I assume everybody had some experience 
already how time can regulate social contacts and events, especially when someone was late for 
an important date or appointment and had to face the consequences of being late. That way 
physical and social time set up a synthesis, where both interact with each other in human 
communities. Physicists always define time by velocity and speed though, but the question is: 
what happens if there is no velocity and no speed? Is time standing still as well? Kant explains it 
that way, that time is a matter of an internal sense, so that even when everything seems to have 
come to a standstill, time as such is still progressing. The human experience is telling the 
individual, that there is a past, present and future, even if any motion around the human has 
slowed down completely (see Kant, B 47 and B 53). Elias on the other hand says that if 
everything has come to a standstill you can’t speak of time anymore (Elias, 1994, p. 40). So for 
me the problem lies in the notion of what time is. Even when everything has come to a standstill, 
the human being recognises that time goes on. When standing inside a room without any motion 
around, time progresses. It might come to a subjective feeling that time has come to a standstill, 
but as the earth continues circulating around its own axis and the sun at the same time, physical 
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time in the relation system of the earth and sun progresses. It’s probably this progress that Kant 
has considered as given a priori. Elias on the other side states that it takes several years to learn 
what time really is. Children take up to 9 years to learn to understand the complicated 
mechanisms of time related to their representatives, the clocks and watches. He also finds it 
amazing that once this process has ended, people tend to forget how complex it was to learn the 
mechanisms of ‘time’ (Elias, 1994, p. 120). So time is a process that has to be learned to 
understand what it means in a society or community and how it regulates the various actions and 
events. That is what Elias understands under ‘social time’, the regulation of civil processes. An 
enquiry of time should not distinguish between ‘human’ and ‘nature’, but it should more or less 
consider it as a whole and assemble it to a ‘human in nature’ complex (Elias, 1994, p. XV). 
 
 
On the myth of the “inside world” 
 
As previously mentioned, Kant considers ‘time’ as a matter of the internal sense, while 
‘space’ is a matter of the external sense. All phenomena which appear to be external, are in 
space, but they are noticed by the human’s senses and therefore they are subjects of our senses 
and so they “are in time and stand necessarily in relations of time” (Kant, B51). Additionally he 
mentions, that time “is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition […] and 
in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing” (Kant, B52). So according to Kant, an 
a priori given subject, like time and space – let us remain with the topic of ‘time’ only – can be 
sensed by the human. Space can definitely be seen or when being in a closed room, also be 
touched (that is when space is limited to a room with four walls, this kind of space ends with the 
walls and they can be touched and felt). But ‘time’ can’t be touched or felt, but changes can be 
noticed, changes that happen within ‘time’ and therefore time is considered to be real, it’s not 
only an imagination of a process. But every human has a different idea about time and therefore 
‘time’ is not an object, it is a matter of an internal experience, probably also of an internal 
imagination, and therefore if the sensory awareness is taken away from it, the term of ‘time’ 
disappears as well (see Kant, B53f). 
Elias criticizes this recognition of Kant that way, that he and his followers consider ‘time’ 
as a matter of an arrangement of events in order to follow after each, other, and that this 
arrangement is internalized in a human as part of its reason, “as an unchangeable attribute of 
human consciousness or of human existence” (Elias, 1994, p. 101). So the internalization of such 
arrangements is considered as a kind of “inside world” (Innenwelt), which is seen as a strict 
division from the “outside world” (Außenwelt) and a quasi-spatial gap between these two worlds 
is considered as an individual and collective fantasy at the same time by Elias (Elias, 1994, p. 
102). “External” objects (space) would project their image into the humans, whose knowledge 
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would be the result of this projection, while the humans would project the specific forms of 
experience of their “internal” intellectual character, ‘spirit’, unchangeable understanding or 
whatsoever on objects of the outside world. (Elias, 1994, S. 104). ‘Time’ as one of these internal 
categories would also be projected on objects then. The essence remains dubious, as on what 
objects time would be projected on. May it be clocks or the course of the sun? Clocks are 
nothing but representatives of time, but they are not THE time. They can represent physical time, 
they can represent social time, but they can’t tell what the essence of time really is. The same 
goes for the course of the sun or the moon. In ancient Egypt the course of the sun was used to 
determine a year and priests and stargazers set the time for sowing, harvesting and festivities. 
This is definitely not a matter of an internal sense. These activities definitely do not come from 
an “inner world”, but they are arranged in a certain order and this order is determined by the 
course of a related object, may it be the sun or the moon or whatever else. 
 
 
The symbol of time, time as a symbol 
 
In physics “time” is very often symbolised by a line, the so called timeline or time bar. It 
starts at a certain point, an arbitrarily set point zero, and continues moving or flowing in one 
direction. This might be a possible way to pack “time” in some figure, but still it is not “the 
time”. It’s all based on Newton’s idea of a continuous flowing one directed time and leaves out 
Einstein’s ideas about the relativity of time completely. Kant also considers time as some kind of 
line and he states that you can’t think of a line, without drawing it in your imagination (Kant, B 
154). So this timeline is some kind of picture of time, a symbol. A symbol can be any kind of 
sign or action that is uploaded with a special meaning and this meaning has to be uploaded over 
and over again, otherwise the symbol loses its original content and meaning. With that loss, the 
symbolic form gets lost and the sign is becoming empty (see Theis, 2008). What makes the 
human different from animals is that the humans have developed a system of signs and symbols, 
which can be transported over long distances and even generations, while animals have quite a 
transfixed system of signs (see Elias, 1991).  
When we go back now to the timeline and try to take Einstein’s Theory of Relativity in 
consideration with trying to draw a line that symbolizes time, then we have a line that keeps 
constantly changing. Depending on the system we are a part of, the time line and the events that 
come along on it, keep changing, moving and the “speed” of time differs. This all is a matter of 
the system we’re a part of and the view in our system from other systems. Kant of course could 
not know about this, but he states that “time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the 
changeable. To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable und permanent, corresponds that 
which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by that 
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the succession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard of time” (Kant, B 
183). So Kant also sees that events can happen at the same time or after each other and when 
they are not on my time line, then I can still experience them, either directly (e.g. by watching a 
course through a window, but not being a part of it) or indirectly (e.g. by knowing that at the 
same time I am far away from it, a course takes place. It’s just that I am divided from it by some 
space). 
When Elias speaks of “time”, he states that “’time’ refers to certain aspects of the 
continuous flow of events, in the middle of which the humans live and of which they are a part 
of” (Elias, 1994, p. 40). So without the human being, the essence of time would not exist. The 
continuous flow of events is essential when speaking about time. As mentioned above, without 
any motion, without any flow of events, a complete standstill would cause that “time” would not 
exist either. For Elias the synchronisation of events, the continuous flow of events is an 
important essence of when trying to explain what time is. He introduces a 5th dimension to the 
universe, the dimension of symbols. The first three dimensions are limited by space, the fourth 
dimension (what physicists consider as “time”) is the dimension of events, which follow each 
other and which are noticed by the humans in time and space, without taking the symbolic 
character of time into consideration. In this way, the 4th dimension would fulfil the requirements 
of “time” in a physical, natural way. The 5th dimension, the dimension of symbols, puts the 
humans in its centre; the humans, who notice the ongoing events in space and time, are the 
observers of the other four dimensions, which are some kind of orientation guides for them. That 
way, Elias sees time as a symbol as is multifunctional, a communicative symbol and a character 
of orientation. The orientation character of time is quite obvious and anyone who has ever been 
late to an important appointment has already experienced it. That way orientation can also be 
quite rigid, as it determines quite exactly at what time what events will take place. There are 
communities, which have a more lenient treatment of time than others. When asking “at what 
time are we going to meet tomorrow?”, the answer is more likely to sound “in the afternoon” 
than “at three o’clock”. This example also shows the communicative character of time as a 
symbol. “Afternoon” stands for a whole time span, it symbolises that period when the sun had 
crossed the zenith and very slowly starts to set in the West. As a point on the time line, it is not 
very exact. For being more exact in setting points of time, humans have developed 
representatives of time: clocks and watches. In the process of civilization, societies tend to 
change from a more lenient usage to a more rigid one. 
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